


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19 October 1954

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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## SUMMARY

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

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2. [redacted] Cambodia embarking on neutralist course (page 3).
3. Comment on threatening Indonesian cabinet crisis (page 4).

### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Comment on Israeli relations with the Arab states and the United Nations (page 5).

### EASTERN EUROPE

5. Moscow radio credits Yugoslav partisans with role in liberation (page 5).

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
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2. [redacted] Cambodia embarking on neutralist course:

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The king of Cambodia recently left the  
strong impression [redacted]

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[redacted] that he would try to steer a precar-  
ious middle course between the East and

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West, [redacted] The king  
hopes in this way to be able to obtain the benefits of both Western  
aid and Communist good will.

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The chief of the French military mission  
in Cambodia has told Ambassador McClintock that while many  
Cambodian leaders were opposed to any attempt to steer a middle  
course, the king would not listen to them.

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Comment: The American embassy has recently suggested that an attack of "Nehruitis" in Cambodia has been brought on partly by the neutralist advice of French, British, and Indian officials there.

Despite evidence of the king's neutralism, Cambodia appears determined to rid itself of Communist influence and has expressed strong dissatisfaction with the delayed and incomplete demobilization of native Viet Minh forces in Cambodia.

3. Comment on threatening Indonesian cabinet crisis:

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The demand of the Greater Indonesian Party (PIR), a small nationalist group, that Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet resign before 25 October or face the loss of its support, represents the most serious threat to the government since it came to power 14 months ago. Two other parties represented in the cabinet have also called for a shake-up and would undoubtedly join the PIR in any walkout.

Government leaders have indicated--with confidence of success--an intention to fight to remain in power. In this they probably will be supported by President Sukarno, who is still extremely influential despite the scandal created by his matrimonial difficulties. Moreover, to overthrow the government by a vote of no confidence, practically all opposition members as well as the defecting parties would have to be present and voting.

The rebellious attitude within the government coalition has been motivated in part by dissatisfaction over the division of spoils. It also reflects growing disgust in Indonesia with incompetence and corruption in government agencies, particularly the Finance and Economic Affairs Ministries, and the inability of the government to deal with increasingly severe economic problems.

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25X1A [redacted]

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## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Comment on Israeli relations with the Arab states and the United Nations:

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[redacted] Israeli foreign policy  
is currently calculated to hamstring the  
UN in its efforts to improve Arab-Israeli  
relations.

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The UN group investigating the alleged  
firing on Egyptian fishermen by the  
Israeli vessel Bat Galim has tentatively  
concluded that that the Egyptians are sin-  
cere in their accusation but have no proof  
whereas the Israelis are "lying and try-

ing to hide something,"

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Ambassador Lodge in New York says that  
the "diatribe" of an Israeli representative against the Palestine  
Conciliation Commission's recent position on the Arab blocked-ac-  
counts issue was an obvious attempt to put the commission in a  
bad light. Lodge reports that the representative's statement and  
demeanor at the 15 October meeting were replete with "implica-  
tions of wrongdoing, evasion of responsibility and bad faith on the  
part of French, Turkish and United States representatives."

UN truce supervisor Burns has told the  
American consul general in Jerusalem that he believes the refusal  
of the Israeli delegate to sign an Israeli-Jordanian "commanders'  
agreement" represents another effort on the part of the "activist"  
group in the Israeli government to eliminate the influence of the  
UN truce organization in the area.

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## EASTERN EUROPE

5. Moscow radio credits Yugoslav partisans with role in liberation:

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[redacted] Moscow radio, in one of a series of tenth  
anniversary accounts of the liberation of

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700220001-8

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Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700220001-8

Yugoslavia, gave the Yugoslav partisans credit for playing a major role. Although the account emphasized the role of the Soviet army, it made repeated references to the collaboration and assistance of the partisans. The broadcast concluded that ten years have not erased the memory of the time when the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples fought side by side against the common enemy.

Comment: This is the first time since 1948 that the Soviet Union has recognized the role of the Yugoslav partisans in the liberation. This lack of Soviet recognition in the past had been regarded by the Yugoslavs as a distortion of history and had been a major public factor in Yugoslav-Soviet antagonism.

The significant reversal of attitude this year is a further manifestation of the Soviet propaganda campaign for improved relations which has included the quotation of selected excerpts from the Yugoslav press and the cessation of hostile propaganda, including the removal of anti-Tito books in Poland. The new move will probably impress Yugoslav Communists more than past "normalization" moves, but Tito's policy still appears to be based upon obtaining the maximum benefits from the Soviet attitude without dropping his guard.

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